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THE INDICTMENT IN NEW YORK*
CHARLES B. NUTTINGt

The struggle behind the adoption of the indictment by New York,
as the required process of accusation for infamous crimes, may be
traced to 1683 with enactment of the "Charter of Liberties and
Privileges." Acting under instructions given him by James, then
Duke of York and Proprietor of the Colony, Governor Dongan
issued writs for the election of a "General Assembly of All the Freeholders." The representatives met in New York on October 7, 1683,
to "consult and debate among themselves all matters as shall be apprehended proper to be established for laws for the good government of
the said Colony of New York and its dependencies." 1 One of the
assembly's first acts of the fifteen passed,2 was the adoption of the
charter mentioned above.'
For the purpose of this study, the most important clause in that
charter was that providing for indictment by a grand jury in criminal
cases. This provision was as follows:'
"Thatt, in all cases capitall or criminall, there shall be a grand
Inquest, who shall first present the offence, and then twelve Men
of the Neighbourhood to try the Offender, who, after his plea to
the indictment shall be allowed his reasonable challenges."
Following approval by the governor, the charter was immediately
proclaimed and put in force.' But its effect was short lived. Though
the instructions given by James to Governor Dongan were such as to
lead the colonists to expect that the proprietor would approve the act'
and though the charter was in fact signed and sealed by him," his
*This paper was prepared in connection with the course in Administration of
Criminal Justice given by Professor Sam Bass Warner at the Harvard Law
School The writer is indebted to Professor Warner for numerous helpful
tCollege of Law, University of Nebraska.
suggestions.
12 BRODHEAD, HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (187,1) 372.
'SPENCER, ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN NEW YoRK (1905) 58. See, SATTERLEE,
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW YORK (1885) 75,
31 LINCOLN, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK (I906) 432.
'CHARTER OF LIBERTIES AND PRIVILEGES, reprinted in 2 BRODHEAD,
6I LINCOLN, op. cit.

Op. Cit.

'Supra note I, at 384.

supra note I, 659, 66o.
supra note

3, 433.

See also INSTRUCTIONS TO GOVERNOR

DONGAN, 3 DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF NEw YoRK
(1853) 331, 332. (hereinafter cited COL. Doc.)

72BRODHEAD, op. cit. supra note 'I, 416; 3 COL. Doc. 348.
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accession to the throne apparently changed his mind for he vetoed
the charter on the third of March, 1685.8 Thus, the first attempt to
secure to the colonists of New York the right of indictment in criminal
cases proved abortive The general assembly met again in i685 and
adjourned until September, 1686, after the enactment of six laws 1
At that time, Governor Dongan "for weighty and important reasons" prorogued it until 1687, and, on January 2oth of that year, it
m
was dissolved by his proclamation.
'
The colonists, however, did not rest content with the outcome of
this effort. Following the flight of James and the beginning of the
reign of William and Mary, a similar attempt to secure the process
of indictment took place.2 The new governor, Sloughter, was empowered to call general assemblies to join with him and the council
in making laws which were to be as nearly as possible "agreeable
unto the Laws and Statutes of this our kingdome of England."' He
called an assembly which convened in New York on April 9, 169i,
a date said to mark the establishment of the first permanent popular
assembly in the state.' On May 13th, this assembly passed "An Act
declaring what are the rights and privileges of their Majesties subjects inhabiting within their province of New York"," the close adherence of which in form to the previous ill-fated Charter of Liberties, may have been an evil omen. At any rate, history was destined
to repeat itself for this act also fell a prey to royal displeasure, being
81 LINCOLN, op. cit. upra .note 3, 435.
Several provisions of the charter
were thought to grant privileges greater than those accorded to inhabitants of
.any other colony. A technical objection was that the charter referred to a
"Lord Proprietor" who had, of course, become the king. 3 COL. Doc.-357-359,

369, 370; 2 BRODHEAD, op. Cit. supra note I, at 423.
'It should be noted that the indictment appears to have been in use in the
colony at this time. See, I LINCOLN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 428; 2 BRoDHEAD,
op. cit. supra note I, at 639.
"None of these concerned indictments. They dealt with taxation, fees, naturalization and other matters. SPENCER,.op. cit. supra note 2, at 58.
UI LINCOLN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 435; SATrERLEE, op. cit. .supra note 2, at
81; and see also 3 COL. Doc. 230, 331.
'An assembly was called by Leisler in I6go, during the confusion attendant
upon the change in rulers, but it accomplished nothing worthy of note as far as
this inquiry is concerned. SATrERLEE, op. cit. supra note 2, 89 ff.; SPENCER, op.
cit. supra note 2, at 59; 1 LINCOLN, op. cit. supra note 3, 437, 438.
3
2 CommIssioN OF Gov. SLOUGHTER, 3 COL. Doc. 623.
14I LINCOLN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 438; 2 BRODHEAD, op. cit. supra note I,
at 642. See 3 COL. Doc. 756.
isILINCOLN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 438.
"°2 BRODHEAD, op. cit. supra note I, at 645; I LINCOLN, op. Cit. supra note 3,
at 438; SATTERLEE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 99.
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disallowed in 1697!' It will be observed that the act was in force in
the colony for more than six years, and Lincoln justly remarks that
its repeal by the crown probably did not affect materially any principle
declared in it.
Nevertheless, there was no constitutional provision in New York
requiring prosecution by indictment after 1697. However, it is
probable that the indictment was used to a considerable extent since
the colonists had been familiar with it and since the instructions to
the various governors provided that the laws of the colony should be
similar to those of England. Yet it was not until 1727, that a renewed
effort was made to legislate on the subject. This time the occasion
for the enactment seems to have been the abuse of the information by
the attorney general resulting in "An Act for Preventing Prosecutions by Informations."" This, in itself the culmination of a political
dispute, initiated a long controversy between the provincial legislature
and the attorney general,' with the crown intervening at crucial
moments in behalf of its officer.'
"'See 4 COL. Doc. 263, 264. King'William is said to have disallowed the act
on the ground that it was incongruous for a subordinate legislature to declare
"what are its privileges." SATrmzLrE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 99.
"Supra note 3, at 441.
disturbed in his
.
''The act of 1727 provided that no one should be " .
liberty or estate . . . upon pretence of any misdemeanor committed otherwise
than by presentment of a Grand Jury or by information by an order from the
Governor . . . signed in Council, for such prosecution." It also provided
for quashing informations previously filed by the attorney general and for
payment of costs and forfeitures by him in certain situations. The preamblealleged that many inhabitants had been prosecuted for trivial offenses "to the
grievous hurt and oppression of his Majestys good Subjects inhabiting the
Said Colony." 2 COL. LAWS oF N. Y. (ed. 1894) 406.
'The act was almost immediately denounced as part of a general design to
weaken royal power in the colony. In 1728 the bill was disallowed. See 5
COL. Doc. 844, 870, 871; JouRN. OF THE LEGISL. COUNCIL OF NEW YoRx 826. In
1734 a bill entitled "An Act for Regulating costs upon prosecutions by information" was introduced in the House, being almost identical with that disallowed
in 1728. No further action 3vas taken on it until it was introduced in the
Council and given its second reading, almost ten years later. Id. at 8io, 826, 827.
In 1754 a somewhat similar "Act to prevent malicious informations in the Supreme Court of Judicature of the Colony of New York" was passed. Id. at
1I81; 3 COL. LAWS OF N. Y. (ed. 1894) ioo7. It required informers to enter
into recognizances to prosecute, providing that they pay costs in event of acquittal or nolle prosse., except where the information was issued by order of
the gover'nor and council or of the supreme court. This constituted a withdrawal by the assembly from its earlier position that informations should be
abolished, but apparently afforded some relief from the situation against which
the first act was aimed.
'Richard Bradley, attorney general 1723-1751, seems to have been continually
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No further legislation on the subject seems to have been enacted
prior to the revolution. The Constitution of 1777, primarily concerned with setting up a form of government, made no specific requirement as to the use of the indictment. However, it is apparent
from several provisions, that its use was contemplated in some criminal cases, although there is no indication that it was intended to be
the exclusive method of initiating prosecutions.' The bill of rights
passed by the legislature in 1787 contained a provision regarding indictments,' but the first constitutional provision of this kind appears
in Article VII, § 7 of the Constitution of 1821, requiring indictment
for capital or otherwise infamous crimes. In 1846 this provision
was embodied in Article I, § 6, of the constitution and has remained.
the same throughout subsequent revisions.
It now becomes material to discover what the courts have done in
construing that requirement. The decisions in the main are less concerned with the process of indictment than with determinations as to
the formal requisites of the written accusation. Numerous criticisms
have been leveled at the absurdly technical decisions in this field, '
but strangely enough, the New York courts adopted a most liberal
attitude in scrutinizing these documents. It must be remembered,
however, that there are very few cases on the subject prior to statutes
simplifying the indictment. Existence of such legislation may have influenced the courts in situations other than those which the acts were
designed to cover. Two early cases, indeed, seem to be fairly subject to criticism on the ground of technicality. One interesting opinion
by Chancellor Kente holds that the caption of an indictment stating
that the grand jurors were sworn and charged without saying "then
and there" is fatally defective because of this omission. "This," he
said, "being an objection to form merely, the. strength of it must rest
altogether on positive authority." Thereupon he adopted the rule
as laid down in certain English cases and reached the conclusion
at swords points with the assembly, which charged him with filing infornations on his own motion in order to extort money from the accused. He lost
n 9 opportunity to protest against these legislative proposals and it is significant
that none were approved until he was gathered to his fathers. 5 COL. Doc.
goo, 9oi; 6 id. 17, 736.
'See ARTs. 33, 34, in i NEw YORK LAws, I, 15.
"'I NEW YORK LAWS 47.

'Much of the criticism has been unintelligent. One exception to this is a
striking article. Perkins, Absurdities of Criminal Procedure (1926) 11 IOWA
L. Rav. 297. As to the situation in England, see I STEPHEN-, HisTORy OF THE
CRImiNAL LAW (1883) 275

ff.

'People v. Guernsey, 3 Johns,

Cas. 265

(N. Y. 18o2).

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
stated. In a somewhat later case,' an indictment for stealing a bank
note which did not conclude, contra formam statuti was held bad,
since the crime was entirely statutory and not known to common law.'
In the main, the statement that New York courts were liberal
appears justified by a review of the cases. In a number of instances
the courts upheld indictments which might well have been invalidated
in other jurisdictions.' Thus, an indictment for illegal sale of liquor
which alleged commission of the offense on a named day and "on
divers other days" was held sufficient, and the'latter portion of the
allegation rejected as surplusage.' An indictment for murder charged
a killing with a knife, but omitted the word "with" so as to make it
appear that the charge was against the knife. Though the judgment
was reversed on other grounds, the indictment was held sufficient,
since the meaning was perfectly plain.' Similarly, omission of "the"
in reciting the title of a statute was held immaterial.' The description of certain bank notes, while not technically accurate, was held
sufficient.'
In regard to setting out written matter on which a
charge was based, New York originally purported to follow the
Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. Houghton,' but apparently
had more respect for its stated exceptions to common law than for
its holding." When the point involved in the Houghton case squarely
arose, the court resorted to a statute which had been passed in the
meantime and held that the requirement was merely a matter of
form and need not be insisted upon."
Though New York has been rather strict in holding that, in purely
'People v. Cook, 2-Park. Cr. R.
'Cf. STATUTE OF 1829 (2 R.

12 (N. Y. 1823).
s. 728) providing that this shall not invalidate an

indictment.
'Some cases from Massachusetts, which probably went as far as any jurisdiction in insisting on observance of technical requirements, are cited in following notes. In a number of instances, Massachusetts and New York courts
reached different conclusions when confronted with similar situations.
"People v. Adams, 17 Wend. 475 (N. Y. 1837) ; Cf. Commonwealth v. Moore,
ii Cush. 6oo (Mass. 1853).
'Shay v. People, 22 N. Y. 317 (i86o) ; Cf. Commonwealth v. A Man Whose
Name is Unknown, 6 Gray 489 (Mass. 1856).
'People v. Walbridge, 6 Cow. 512 (N. Y. x826).
"People v. Jackson, 8 Barb. 637 (N. Y. 185o) ; Cf. Commonwealth v. Wilson,
2 Gray 7o (Mass. 1854).
"8 Mass. io7 (1811). The case held it necessary to set out such matter
exactly.
'People v. Kingsley, 2 Cow. 522 (N. Y. 1824) ; People v. Badgley, I6 Wend.
53 (in. Y. 1836).

'Tomlinson v. People, 5 Park. 313 (Ni. Y. 1862) ; 2 it. s. (1829)

728.
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statutory crimes, the indictment must bring the offense precisely within the stated terms,' a slavish adherence to the very words of an act
has not been generally required.' The courts have also been quite
willifhg to save indictments by disregarding certain allegations as
surplusage not necessary to be proven, for example, allegations appropriate in charging felonies in indictments for. misdemeanors.7 Although an allegation of time was essential, as long as it was alleged,
even though it made an indictment show on its face that the offense
was committed more than three years before and hence was barred
by the statute of limitations, it was held the alleged date was wholly
immaterial and commission of the offense within the statutory period
could be proven.' This decision was probably in accord with common
law and seems to be an illustration of the failure of the indictment to
fulfill its purpose of informing a defendant of the charge against him.
Allegations of the precise place of commission of an offense were
held immaterial as long as jurisdiction was shown-the courts taking
judicial notice, for example, of location of towns within their respective counties.'"
From the foregoing discussion, it appears that New York courts if
left to themselves, might have worked out a system of criminal pleading free from taint of technicality, thus making legislative intervention unnecessary. But despite the apparent truth of this assertion,
the fact is that attempts to "reform" the indictment by statutory simplification have been made for well over a hundred years. The first
measure, passed in 18oi' was not at all comprehensive but -merely
provided that failure to include "with force and arms" or words of
similar nature should not render void an indictment for treason,
'Thus, an indictment for embezzlement under a statute covering embezzlement by clerks and servants was held bad because it alleged the defendant was
an agent. People v. Allen, 5 Den. 76 (N. Y. 1847). An indictment for defrauding a gas company which followed the words of the statute but did not
state the name of the gas company was held bad. People v. Wilber, 4 Park.
ig (N. Y. I8s7).
'People v. Rynders, 12 Wend. 425 (N. Y. 1834) ; People v. Enoch, 13 Wend.
159 (N. Y. 1834); Thompson v. People, 3 Park. 208 (N. Y. I856).
"E. g., an allegation charging an act done wilfully and corruptly. People
v. Bogart, 3 Abb. Pr. i93 (N. Y. 1856); an indictment charging facts constituting a felony but an intent which, under statute, constituted only a misdemeanor. Lohman v. People, i N. Y. 379 (1848), aff'g People v. Lohman, 2
Barb. 216 (1848).

'People v. Van Santvoord, 9 Cow. 654 (N. Y. 1821).
' 0Wood v. People, i Hun 381 (N. Y. 1874), rev'd other grounds in 59 N. Y.
I17; Vanderwerker v. People, 5 Wend. 530 (N. V. i83o).
42I

NEW YoRx LAWS 261.
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felony, trespass or any other offense. In the same year, a simplified
form of indictment for perjury was prescribed.' A somewhat broader
enactment, designed to prevent indictments from being held insufficient for various minor mistakes, was passed in 1829."'This
apparently concluded the movement for reform until it' reappeared, as
part of the general agitation for codification conducted by David Dudley Field, in i842.
Field attempted to introduce in the state legislature a bill to simplify indictments, but without result." Then in 1850, the report of
the commissioners on practice and pleading, of whom Field was one,
dealt at considerable length with indictments and recommended simplified forms." Much was derived from Livingston's Criminal Code,
drawn by authority of the Louisiana legislature twenty-five years before. The commissioners were influenced also by work being done
6
in England along the same line."
They dwelt in detail on absurdities
of the indictment at common law, but their illustrations appear to
have been taken entirely from English cases cited in Archbold's
Criminal Pleading,"' and it may be doubted whether cases in their own
jurisdiction tended to support their contentions."
The pathetic prophecy of the commissioners, born of sad experfence with conservatism, that "They will not flatter themselves with
the idea that their labors in this respect will meet with the universal
approbation of the legal profession"' was all too fully realized.' Although Field succeeded in bringing the code of criminal procedure up
"It was declared unnecessary to set out the record of proceedings or to state
facts other than those prescribed by statute. I NEW YoRK LAWS X13.
"No indictment should be held insufficient because of misstatement or omission of defendant's title or estate, non-prejudicial omission of town or county
of his residence, omission of "with force and arms" or words of similar nature;
omitting to declare that offense was committed contrary to statute; any nonprejudicial defect in matters of form. 2 REv. STAT. (1829) pt. 4 c. 2 tit. 4 P.
728.
"Letter to John L. O'Sullivan, I SPEECHES, ARG. AND Misc. PAPEus OF DAVID
DUDLEY FIELD (1884)

223.

"FINAL REPT. OF THE COM'RS. ON PRACTICE AND PLEADING, CRIMINAL CODE

(1850).
"The work of the British Commissioners resulted in Lord Campbell's Act,
14 & 15 VIcr. c. IOO (1851). This was criticized for not going far enough in simplifying indictments through fear that an accused would be prejudiced. LORD
CAMPBELL'S ACT (Greave's ed.) ii, iii. See I STEPHEN, HISTORY OF CRIMINAL
LAW (1883) 286, and COHEN, INDITMENTS AT, i915 (ii6)
with introduction
by Sir Harry Poland.
"'REPORT OF COM'as., op. cit. supra note 46, 142-145.
"See discussion of early New York cases, supra.
"REPORT OF COMR'S., op. cit. supra note 45, at i4o.
'See REPORT OF THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE OF THE ASSEMBLY ON THE BILL
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for passage during the session of 1855,' not until 188i-after thirtytwo years of delay and after adoption by eighteen other states and
territories'--was it enacted in New York. The act as passed was
almost identical with that proposed in 185o except for omission of
the schedule of forms. The legislature also approved an added provision for amendment of the indictment during course of trial when
not prejudicial to a defense on the meritsY What happened during
intervening years to change the opinion of the legislature, can only
be conjectured. Possibly a manifestation of a new attitude toward
codification as a whole, or a growing, impatience with the formalism
characteristic of criminal procedure during the earlier part of the
century, was responsible.'
At any rate, thirst for reform was satisfied, and except for a few
minor changes' almost half a century elapsed before enactment in
1929 of a statute providing for optional use of the "short form" of
indictment with bill of particularsY The principle embodied in this
statute had been recommended by the New York Crime Commission
on at least two occasions.
The act specifically provides that indictments good at common law or drawn in accordance with provisions
of the Code of 1881 shall continue to be sufficient, thus making the use
of this short form optional with district attorneys. And this is the
extent of legislation to date dealing with indictments.
Examination of cases decided since enactment of the statutes discussed above cannot be said to reveal any change in attitude of the
courts regarding indictments. In view of the early cases already
considered, the courts might be expected immediately to fall in with
the spirit of the proposed changes and uphold the acts involved from
the outset. Although few cases have been discovered in which the
earlier legislation was scrutinized, it was evidently given effect.
TO CONTINUE IN

OFFICE THE

COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE

AND

PLEADINGS

(849) 14-15. The modern observer may wonder at the vehemence of the attack set forth on these pages, but such dismal utterances were typical of the
attitude of many lawyers toward codification in general. See also, passirn, CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF OUR COMMON LAW (1884).
'FIELD, A THIRD OF A CENTURY DEVOTED TO LAW REFORM (1873) 7.
"FIELD, LAW REFOR.I IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS INFLUENCE ABROAD

(1891)

12.

'LAws, 1881 VOL. 2 pt. 4 c. 2.
"Id. c. 3.
'See POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AmmIcA (1930) i6o ff.
''See NEv YoiB LAws, 1882 c. 36o; 1883 c. 306.
"Id. 1929 c. 176.
rsNEw YORK CRIME Comm. REP. (1928) ig; Id. (929) at 58.
wEighmy v. People, 79 N. Y. 546 (I88O), holding that, under a statute
(I N. Y. L4,ws, 261 (2d ed. 18o7)) of 18ol, an averment in an indictment for
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Numerous cases holding indictments sufficient which complied with
the requisites laid down by the code of criminal procedure may be
cited.' Many of them contain expressions indicating the extent to
which the courts recognized the underlying purpose of the statute and
voiced approval of it. Thus, in People v. Everest,' it is said at page.
24:

"The form and method of framing an indictment as prescribed
by statute is worthy of commendation for its simplicity and ready
comprehension by all persons who have a reasonable degree of intelligence, and should be adhered to by the pleader having charge
of the prosecution."
Other examples appear in the footnote.' It is interesting to note,
however, the requirement that a charge must bring an offense squarely within terms of a statute was apparently not relaxed in later decisions." The obviously correct view is stated thus:"
int*ili-bthe rule that the offense must be charged in plain
and intelligible language, . . . is and ought to be preserved
perjury that the court had authority to administer the oath was sufficient;
People v. Bennett, 37 N. Y. 17 (1867), holding an indictment sufficient under
the provisions of 2 REv. STAT. (1829) 728; Biggs v. People, 8 Barb. 547 (N. Y.
I85O), upholding an indictment under the same act. See, Critchon v. People,
i Keyes 341 (N. Y. 1864).

'No attempt has been made to give an exhaustive citation of cases, but the
following are typical: People v. Conroy, 97 N. Y. 62 (1884) ; People v. Rugg,
98 N. Y. 537 (1885) ; People v. Willson, iog N. Y. 345, 16 N. E. 540 (1888) ;
People v. Everest, 5, Hun 19, 3 N. Y. Supp. 612 (1889); People v. Albow,
14o N. Y. i3o, 35 N. E. 438 (1893) ; People v. Willis, 158 N. Y. 392, 53 N.
E. 28 (1899) ; People v. Williams, 243 N. Y. 162, 153 N. E. 35 (1926).
S51 Hun 19, 3 N. Y. Supp. 612 (1889).
"'It's (the code's) true office was to abrogate the technical rules formerly
governing the construction of criminal pleadings and to substitute therefor the
simplicity and liberality of interpretation presented by the new system of criminal procedure." People v. Conroy, 97 N. Y. 62, 69 (1884).
"We have inherited from England many technical rules relating to criminal
practice which have long since become obsolete

. . . An advanced civiliza-

tion, and a more humane administration of the law have removed the causes
which gave rise to these technical rules, and there is therefore no good reason
for ietaining them.
"This statute (2 R. S. 728) swept away many of the objections to the form
of indictments which at times seriously interfered with an effective administration of criminal justice." People v. Bennett, 37 N. Y. 117, 120 (1867).
"People v. Albow, 14o N. Y. 130, 35 N. E. 438 (1893) ; Wood v. People, 53
N. Y. 51I (1873); People v. Tremaine, 129 Misc. 650, 222 N. Y. Supp. 432
(1927); Phelps v. People, 72 N. Y. 334 (1878).
"People v. Albow, i4o N. Y. 130, 134, 35 N. E. 438 (1893).

THE INDICTMENT IN NEW YORK

589

alike for the protection of the accused and in the interest of the
certain and orderly administration of the criminal law."
Nor does it appear that statutory simplification of indictments has
had an appreciable effect on the number of reversals by appellate
courts on technical grounds. The appended tables indicates that
even before enactment of the code of criminal procedure, cases were
not being reversed for such reasons and no change is shown as a
result of the code. Thus, though the legislation in question may
have made the drafting of indictments easier and simpler, it does
not seem to have affected the administration of justice.
The New York act of 1929 deserves special consideration. As
has been said, its most noteworthy feature is provision that the indictment shall merely name the offense charged while a description
of acts constituting such offense shall be stated in a bill of particulars
furnished to the defendant at his request.
An indictment under this statute was upheld by the Court of Appeals in People v. Bogdanoff.' This indictment, simply charging murder without setting out the facts relied on-a bill of particulars being
furnished by the district attorney-was held sufficient. The result of
the case is somewhat startling on first inspection, since, if the indictment as a document rather than as a process is considered significant,
it seems virtually to deny to the defendant his right of indictment as
it previously existed in the state. One of the essential features of an
55n an attempt to determine the effect of legislation on the number of appeals and reversals, the writer examined the decisions in the New York Corrt
of Appeals for the years indicated. The first period was the time when agitation for the code of criminal precedure commenced. The second and third
represent the five years immediately precedinig and following the enactment
of the code, and the year 193o was chosen to show the recent trend' The total

for the last named year includes memorandum opinions and since they do not
indicate the ground of appeal, the number of cases given as involving technicalities may not be inclusive. Such things as failure to state all the elements of
the crime with precise accuracy, failure to follow the exact words of a statute,
failure to state the time of the offence with sufficient definiteness, duplicity and
minor variances have been considered "technicalities" for the purpose of this
study. It is interesting to note that a similar tabulation made by the writer
with reference to Massachusetts cases showed a marked decrease in the number of cases appealed and reversed following the enactment of comprehensive
"reform" legislation in that state.
Years

1847-51

1876-80
1882-86

1930

Appealed Cases Cases involving Reversed on
technicalities technicalities

10

2

0

81
115

13
10

1
1

49

-3

'254 N. Y. 6, 17i N. E. 89o (193o).

% of technical
appeals reversed

0
See (930)

% of whole
number

0

0

8
10

1
1

0

0

30 CoL. L. Ry. io5i.
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indictment, so New York courts have asserted, is that it should
contain a statement of acts constituting an offense charged." In
eliminating that feature, the statute resulted, in the opinion of one
of the more conservative members of the bench at least, in depriving
the defendant of his constitutional rights.'
But it is believed that consideration of this case in the light of the
historical material already discussed, will lead to the conclusion that
it can be defended. The constitutional provision requiring the use of
the indictment was evidently intended to secure the process of indictment, i. e., an investigation by the grand jury, rather than to petrify
the then existing form of document.' If this be true, it seems that as
long as such a hearing may be had under the statute to the same extent as under previous legislation, constitutional objections are unfounded. The requirement of a bill of particulars secures to the defendant the means of obtaining all necessary information, and the fact
that in New York minutes are kept of proceedings of the grand jury
would effectively prevent a substitution of charges by the prosecutor."
However, it should be noted that the Bogdanoff case has apparently aroused some opposition among the lower courts of the state.'
The opinion itself contains a caveat to the effect that the decision is
not to be construed as judicial approval of the form used,' and it is
difficult to make an intelligent guess as to what the course of judicial
decision in the future will be. From the opinion, it seems probable
that in cases where testimony before the grand jury involves a series
of crimes, and there may be doubt as to which one is covered by the
indictment, a different result may be reached"
'In People v. Dumar, io6 N. Y. 5o2, 5og, 13 N. E. 325 (1887), it is said:

"The indictment, therefore, must charge the crime, and it must also state

the act constituting the crime.

The omission of these things would

necessarily be fatal to the indictment."
See People v. Stark, 136 N. Y. 538, 32 N. E. io46 (893) ; People v. Corbalis,

178 N. Y. 516, 71 N. E. ro6 (i904).
'See dissenting opinion of Crane, J., in People v. Bogdanoff, supra note 66,

at 33.
'The contention has been made that formalities in the written document were
required to show that the grand jury had considered all essential elements of
a case. See (1929) 24 ILLImois L. Rav. 319. However true this may have
been historically, in view of the present practice, by which the indictment is
prepared by the prosecutor and has little if any relation to what takes place
in the grand jury room, it would seem to have little bearing on the validity
(GM. CR. CODE (1932) CR. PR. sec. 952 t.
of the statute in question.
'See People v. Meehan, i42 Misc. 6o5, 254 N. Y. Supp. 477 (193i) ; People
v. Lisandrelli, i39 Misc. 129, 249 N. Y. Supp. 55 (1931).
"Supra, note 67, 31.

1Id. at

32.

THE INDICTMENT IN NEW YORK
It seems fair to say in conclusion that New York, while preserving
the process of indictment, has minimized the importance of the form
of the written accusation to the greatest possible extent. Although
legislation has aided in prescribing simplified form and in doing away
with technical requirements, it has largely been unnecessary in view
of the courts' liberal attitude in determining the validity of indictments. There are indications that future activity will be concerned
over doing away with the process of indictment in most cases and
substituting for it, the information c' But that is another and a highly
controversial topic." New York's simplified form of indictment as
it stands-perhaps as monumental recognition of the trend of judicial
decision within the state-seems to be a commendable practice when
the cry all over the country is for reform it criminal administration
in the direction of simpler and more efficient procedure.
"'An attempt was made in 1925 to provide for prosecution by information
upon written application of the accused but this was held unconstitutional by
the Court of Appeals. LAws, 1925 c. 597; People ex rel. Battista v. Christian,
249 N. Y. 314, 164 N. E. III (1928).
See (I929) 24 IL. L. REv. 319; (1932)
30 MicH. L. REV. 928. Proposals for adoption of the information in felony
cases were made to the Joint Legislative Committee on the Coordination of Civil
and Criminal Practice Acts in 1926. REPORT (1926) 22. In 1929 the crime
commission recommended a constitutional provision authorizing use of the information upon waiver of indictment by the defendant. REPORT (igg) 54.
'Important articles on this problem are: Miller, Informations or Indictments in Felony Cases (z924) 8 MiN. L. REV. 379; Moley, Initiation of
Criminal Prosecutions by Indictment or Information (i931) 29 MIcH. L. REv.
4o3; Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System (1931) io ORE. L. REv. ior,
217, 295; Hall, Analysis of Criticism of the Grand Jury (1932) 22 J. C1ns. L.
692; Dession, From Indictment to Information (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 163.

